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JURISDICTION
This Court may have jurisdiction pursuant to U.C.A. §78A-4-103 and Rule 42(a) if the
orders are final. This appeal has been filed in anticipation of a final order pursuant to
Rule 4( c) to preserve the appeal. The Court likely has not yet obtained appellate
jurisdiction.

ISSUES
Issue I:

The court erred raising "staleness" sua sponte.

Preservation: Sua sponte ruling could not be challenged:

Issue II:
The court erred in not deciding whether the June 2012 Order was the
court's final appealable order.
Preservation: Sua sponte ruling could not be challenged:

Issue III:
The court has repeatedly abused its discretion by refusing to entertain
challenges to alleged mistakes by its predecessor.
SOR: a legal question presented in law-of-the-case packaging, correctness standard of
review. Blackmore v. L&D Dev. Inc., 2016 UT App 198, if 23
Preservation: Combined Memorandum

Issue IV:
The court erred in assuming subject matter jurisdiction over the
ownership dispute in supplemental proceedings.
Preserved pgs.25-26, Combined Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Sanctions and
in Support of Motion to Strike May 6th Order and Motion for Sanctions. REC.3849,
("Combined Memorandum").

Issue V:
Judge Kennedy erred in holding the court had personal jurisdiction
over Barnett when he only appeared specially under Rule 64(e)(l) to protect his
property from unlawful seizure.
Preserved pgs.19-21 Combined Memorandum. REC.3867-3868.

Issue VI:
Judge Kennedy erred in not entering adequate findings of fact and
conclusions of law for the September 25th hearing, as required by Rule 52.
Preservation: Combined Memorandum

Issue VII: Any purported finding of ownership by GFS was clearly erroneous since
there was no evidence at all that GFS purportedly owned the assets and not Barnett.
Preservation: Could not raise defect with ruling: plain error.
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Issue VIII: Judge Kennedy repeatedly erred by relying on his personal recollection
that he made findings from the bench regarding ownership of each asset when he
did not make such rulings.
Preserved Combined Memorandum

Issue IX:
Judge Kennedy erred by relying on his personal recollection that he
issued a "continuing" injunction against Barnett.
Preserved Combined Memorandum

Issue X:
Judge Kennedy erred by not requiring a bond for the mythical
injunction, and then holding Barnett in contempt for not complying with the
inoperative injunction.
Preserved p.58 Combined Memorandum REC.3906.

Issue XI:
The court denied Barnett his constitutional right to a fair hearing
before a fair tribunal when Judge Kennedy refused to recuse himself, and he was
not disqualified by his fellow judges.
Preserved Motion to Disqualify, Motion Reconsider Disqualification, Motion Reinstate
Disqualification.

Issue XII: The court repeatedly erred in holding contempt proceedings without a
mandatory jurisdictional affidavit being filed.
Preserved Combined Memorandum

Issue XIII: Judge Kennedy erred by holding Barnett in contempt for not obeying
unlawful orders.
Preserved Combined Memorandum

Issue XIV: The court never acquired personal jurisdiction over Barnett for any
contempt proceedings because he was never properly served.
Preserved p.31-36 Combined Memorandum REC.3879-3884.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Interpretation of Rule of Procedure - question of law, Ashton v. Learnframe, 185
P.3d 1135 (UT App 1990).
Conpliance with Rule of Procedure-question of law, Avila v. Winn, 794 P.2d 20,
22 (Utah 1990).
Due process - question of law, USA Power v. Pacificorp, 2010 UT 31.
5
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NATURE OF PROCEEDING

This appeal is taken from supplemental proceedings.
Plaintiffs Ross and Wagner (collectively "Ross") prevailed on a partial summary
judgment motion in 2008 and wrongfully obtained a writ of execution before there was a
final judgment. Ross appeared to be trying to seize property belonging to non-party
appellant Michael Barnett. Defendant Global Fraud Solutions LLC ("GFS") objected to
the Writ claiming the property was not its own, and requested a hearing. Barnett entered
a special appearance pursuant to Rule 64(e)( 1) to protect his property from unlawful
seizure, (primarily two training courses he authored and a Nevada corporation, The
Institute of Fraud Risk Management ("TIFRM") ), and moved to quash the wrongfully
obtained Writ as being premature. Judge Kennedy held a hearing on September 25,
2008, where, without notice to Barnett he intended to do so, he purportedly determined
the ownership of the disputed assets, despite the fact he lacked jurisdictional authority to
do so since Barnett was a non-party, and should have summarily discharged the writ as
wrongfully obtained pre-judgment.
During the September hearings, Judge Kennedy purportedly froze the bank
account of TIFRM for IO days by means of a defective oral TRO until the hearing on the
25th, at which time he sua sponte extended the bank freeze again, without date, as which
point it automatically expired October 5, 2008.
Judge Kennedy believed he entered specific findings on the 25 th that GFS owned
Barnett's assets, not Barnett, but there are no such findings in the Transcript. Judge
Kennedy also believed he entered a "continuing" injunction that Barnett not divert or
6
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

dissipate the funds or assets of TIFRM, but again no such order appears in the
Transcripts.
At a subsequent hearing on the motion to quash the Writ, Ross conceded the Writ
was premature and offered to abandon it if Judge Kennedy would certify the partial
summary judgment as final, which Judge Kennedy did, and Ross obtained a second Writ
of Execution, this time seeking more property, including the assets of non-party TIFRM.
Barnett appeared specially again pursuant to Rule 64(e)( 1) and opposed the new Writ and
requested a hearing thereon, which was set for January 27, 2009, but Judge Kennedy
refused to allow him a hearing, insisting he was not going to "re-litigate" the question of
ownership.
Ross' counsel prepared proposed findings and Order from the events of January
27, 2009, which sat idle until June of 2012, and which time Judge Kennedy signed it,
mistakenly declaring there was no objection thereto, even though Barnett has objected to
it. Within the required time, Barnett filed a provisional Motion to Reconsider the June
2012 Order, or in the alternative, a Rule 52/59 Motion to amend or provide a new trial (if
it was considered the final appealable judgment), and a motion for clarification as to
whether the June 2012 Order was intended to be the final appealable order. The motions
then sat dormant.
Ross has never tried in the intervening 8 years to set either of the Writs for a sale.
But he did ask the court to hold Barnett in contempt for not complying with a nonexistent "continuing" injunction, at which point Judge Kennedy found Barnett had not
complied with the mythical injunction and therefore sanctioned him by ordering him to
7
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turn over some of his personal property and property belonging to TIFRM, and control of
TIFRM.
Barnett properly exercised his constitutional right to an open court to challenge the
unlawful conduct of Judge Kennedy by moving to strike his void order, and in return
Judge Kennedy held him in contempt again, this time for not obeying the void order to
tum over the property.
Judge Kennedy subsequently impermissibly ordered Barnett sua sponte to appear
and show cause why he should not be held in contempt of the second void contempt
order. Barnett again exercised his constitutional right to an open court to challenge the
void order to appear by moving to strike it and moving to continue the void hearing until
after the motion to strike was decided, and informed Judge Kennedy he could not afford
to come to Utah for the hearing. Judge Kennedy again held him in contempt for not
appeanng.
In 2016, Judge Harris directed Barnett to complete and submit the
Reconsideration/Rule 52/57 Motion. Barnett and Ross resumed briefing the original
Motions, including the Motion for Clarification. Judge Harris refused to declare whether
the June 2012 order was in fact a final appealable order, but held it was Judge Kennedy's
intent that it be the final word on the question of ownership, and directed the parties to rebrief according! y.
When the Motion was filed, Judge Harris sua sponte held the Rule 52/59 Motion
"stale" and refused to address its merits. This appeal was then taken in case the ruling is
in fact the final appealable order (although it is believed it is not).
8
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BACKGROUND
1.

On September 15, 2008, Plaintiffs' Counsel, requested that the Court not

allow Barnett to withdraw any funds from the "subsidiary" TIFRM for himself
"personally" until the September 25 th hearing. 1 Judge Kennedy indicated, without any
discussions as to the merits of a TRO, "I'll issue an injunction today preventing the
withdrawal of any funds in that account that are referred to the Nevada bank account." 2
He subsequently stated: "So, I'm enjoining the expenditure of those funds except as I've
indicated. " 3 The forgoing two statements were the entire language of the Court stated on
September 15, 2008, that could possibly be considered as a TRO or "injunction." 4
2.

Robert Malinckrodt, testified Barnett personally hired him to apply for a

provisional application for a patent for CasePlanner, and a "utility application" on behalf
of Mr. Barnett as the owner. 5
3.

Barnett testified and presented evidence as to his ownership of TIFRM,

including its Articles of Incorporation (Exhibit 1), its Nevada State corporate charter
(Exhibit 2), and its stock certificate no. 1 issued in the name of Barnett for 75,000 shares
(Hearing 4). 6 Barnett testified he was the only director and the president, secretary and
treasurer of TIFRM, 7 and he never transferred any of his shares to anyone else. 8

1

September 15 th Transcript,pg.13,lines 16-24.
September 15 th Transcript,pg.14,lines 20-22.
3
September 15 th Transcript,pg.17 ,line 25 to pg.18 line 1.
4
September 15 th Transcript,pg.13 to pg. I 8.
5
September 25 th Transcript,pgs.14-20.
6
September 25 th Transcript,pg.21 to pg.26.
7
September 25 th Transcript,pg.26,lines 6-13.
8
September 25 th Transcript,pg.26,line 14 to pg.27 line 2.
2

9
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4.

Plaintiffs did not produce any evidence that TIFRM was a subsidiary of

GFS or was not owned by Barnett.
5.

Barnett testified he was "the author and copyright [owner] of the CITRMS

certification course," 9 and introduced the licensing agreement between TIFRM and
himself, (Exhibit 6) which allowed TIFRM to publish the CITRMS course so long as
Barnett allows, wherein TIFRM expressly disavows any ownership interest in the
CITRMS course or any intellectual property of Barnett. 10
6.

Barnett introduced the Agreement to License Intellectual Property Software

and Content, (Exhibit 11) which licensed to GFS the right to publish Barnett's
CasePlanner system, which expressly disavows any claim GFS might own any of the
intellectual property of Barnett, including without limitation the CasePlanner program. 11
7.

Barnett introduced the certificate of copyright registration with the US.

Copyright office for the CITRMS course and related materials (Exhibit 13) showing he is
the owner. 12
8.

Barnett testified Ross agreed Barnett owned the copyrights. 13

9.

Barnett testified he never transferred any ownership in any of the

intellectual property discussed at the hearing. 14

9

September 25 th Transcript,pg.36,lines 16-17.
10
September 25 th Transcript,pg.28,line 9 to pg.29,line 7.
11
September 25 th Transcript, pg.34,line 9 to pg 35,line 5.
12
September 25 th Transcript, pg.37,line 9 to pg 38,line 4.
13
September 25 th Transcript, pg.38,line 9 to pg 39,line 12.
14
September 25 th Transcript, pg.39,lines 13-16.
10
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10.

Plaintiffs did not present any witnesses, but simply cross examined

Barnett. 15
11.

Plaintiffs did not introduce into the record any evidence Barnett did not in

fact own TIFRM, CITRMS, or CasePlanner™ or any evidence to contradict any of the
evidence introduced by Barnett.
12.

Plaintiffs expressly admitted TIFRM was a separate corporation from

GFS. 16
13.

Plaintiffs' examination of Barnett focused heavily on whether Ross knew of

the ownership of the various assets discussed, not actual ownership thereof.
14.

17

Plaintiffs reviewed GFS's Objection to the March 14th Writ, (Exhibit 17)

but no testimony was elicited to prove GFS owned any disputed assets. 18
15.

Plaintiffs reviewed GFS's Schedules from its bankruptcy (Exhibits 18 and

19), but no testimony was elicited to show any ownership of the assets by GFS. 19
16.

Plaintiffs presented several emails with Distance Leaming Center

discussing the possibility of DLC serving as a vendor to GFS, and proposed drafts of a
possible agreement which was never consummated, which discussion did not elicit any
testimony as to ownership of the disputed assets. 20

15

See September 25 th Transcript generally.
September 25 th Transcript, pg.45 ,lines 17-18.
17
See September 25 th Transcript generally.
18
September 25 th Transcript,pg.56 to pg.58.
19
September 25 th Transcript,pg.59 to pg.63.
20
September 25 th Transcript,pg.64 to pg. 70.
16
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17.

Plaintiffs addressed various emails with PrePaid Legal Services regarding

initial discussions about PrePaid associates possibly using Barnett's CITRMS, and
various drafts of possible agreements which were never consummated, which again did
not result in any testimony or evidence of ownership of the assets. 21
18.

On redirect, Barnett testified he never signed an agreement with GFS to

license any portion of CITRMS beyond the excerpt known as the Identity Theft
Awareness Guide. 22
19.

On redirect, Barnett explained why he did not license his CITRMS course

to GFS: "Unfortunately, the companies that we were doing business with or proposing to
do business with refused to do business with [GFS]. They viewed [GFS] as competing
directly with- the offerings of [GFS], the software products, competed directly with the
offerings that these companies had. They wanted to be able to utilize my course, but they
did not want to have anything to do with [GFS]. " 23
20.

On redirect, Barnett explained "[t]he purpose of incorporating TIFRM was

to create a company through which I could sell my own personal property, the CITRM's
course. The companies we were talking with, as I was previously looking at offering the
course through [GFS], they refused to do business with [GFS]. They viewed it as directly
competing. They did not want any reference to CasePlanner, to the [GFS] website even,
or any such thing included in the course. So because no business would do business with

21
22

23

September 25 th Transcript,pg 74 to pg.90.
September 25 th Transcript,pg 10 l ,lines 17-21.
September 25 th Transcript,pg.102,line 20 to pg.103,line 2.
12
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[GFS] for the purpose of purchasing or utilizing my course, and it was my own course, I
set up my own company to offer my own private property for sale." 24
21.

Exhibit 14 was an email from Ross to Barnett, wherein Ross stated: "It

would be my preference for the CITRMS' ISG and exam to be the foundation and for
you to continue to hold copyrights, et cetera." 25
22.

Plaintiffs' counsel did not identify any actual evidence of ownership by

GFS in his closing argument, but merely argued the evidence they introduced "show[ed]
clearly that all of these assets have been represented time and time and time again to be
the assets of [GFS] .... " This was Plaintiffs' only argument that GFS owned the assets.
23.

Plaintiffs' counsel again conceded in closing arguments that TIFRM is not

a "subsidiary" of GFS, when he stated "we have no issue or problem that these are
separate entities. " 26
24.

In his discussion about the evidence presented regarding CasePlanner,

Judge Kennedy noted:

27

It seems to me that there are a number of key issues here. One of them is whether
the code is really any different from software. It seems to the Court that despite the
testimony of Mr. Barnett, that there is a difference and that the difference was meant
to have some significance, that that difference was not consistently followed.
In addition, one of the key concerns that the Court has is whether there was ever
any effort made by Mr. Barnett to have Mr. Ross, the plaintiff, understand that he
claimed an ownership interest in this software whether in contrast to the code or not.
It seems to me that the evidence shows that over the period of the involvement of
these parties with each other that Mr. Barnett never communicated the view to Mr.
24

25
26

27

September 25 th Transcript, pg.105,lines 13-25.
September 25 th Transcript, pg.38 lines 9-25.
September 25 th Transcript, pg.118,lines 18-19.
September 25 th Transcript, pg.121,lines 12 to pg.122, line 15.
13
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Ross that he owned separately and apart from GFS this invention or the software
and that repeatedly throughout the emails, whether to Mr. Ross or to third parties, by
Mr. Barnett the impression is given over and over again that he did not and that it
was GFS' property.
I found that the witness-that the-Mr. Barnett's testimony was evasive and
inconsistent and not credible. It seems to me that Mr. Barnett repeatedly made
statements and took actions for which plaintiff - and that the plaintiff was aware of
and for which the plaintiff could reasonably be expected to conclude that GFS had,
indeed, licensed the software and had an interest in that software. And although
Mr. Barnett went through the motions to create the corporation to try to keep the
software from GFS and retained it under his personal name, it appears that at
no time did he communicate such actions to the plaintiff.
25.

The forgoing does not contain any findings as to ownership of CasePlanner,

and none was made at any other time.
26.

The Court next noted regarding TIFRM: 28

It's also interesting that the TIFRM corporation was formed after the time that Mr.
Ross filed his UCC filing against all the assets of GFS. It also is apparent that GFS
was involved in negotiations regarding the case planner software before TIFRM was
even formed. So while it may be so that the stock certificate form which was signed
by Mr. Barnett and apparently never revealed to Mr. Ross, maybe that established
some kind of prima facia evidence of ownership, it seems to me that the rest of the
evidence overwhelmingly shows that that really wasn't the case and that wasn't the
understanding of the parties in this case as time went on.

27.

There is no actual finding in the record that GFS owns TIFRM.

28.

The Court made the following summary observation concerning CITRMS:

"Same thing with respect to CITRMS course .... " 29 But no finding was made that GFS
actually owns CITRMS.

28
29

September 25 th Transcript,pg.122,Iine 16 to pg.123,line I
September 25 th Transcript,pg.123,lines 2-3.
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29.

The Court then gave the only statement that could possibly be considered a

"finding" or "ruling" as to ownership of a single unidentified "asset":
All right. Well, the Court finds that the asset in this case is the asset of GFS based
upon statements by Mr. Barnett to the effect that he is GFS and based on the
other indications that are set forth in the exhibits that were introduced today
including the sworn statement filed with the Court, including the repeated
statements in the various documents and emails that have been presented.
30.

"The asset" was never identified by Judge Kennedy. No explanation was

ever given by Judge Kennedy as to why Barnett's statement that he was GFS is relevant
to the question of ownership of property by GFS. No legal conclusions supporting the
Court's "finding" were given on the record.
31.

Then the Court, sua sponte, "extended" the September 15 th "injunction"

freezing TIFRM's bank accounts as follows: "So I'm going to further enjoin any
additional expenditure of funds coming in on this as we already have. I'm going to
extend that iniunction ... "

32.

Barnett never consented to the "extension" of the September 15 th TRO

exceeding ten days, resulting in the September 15 th TRO, if it existed, expiring no later
than October 5, 2008 by Rule 65A(b)(2).
33.

The Court did not take any action that could be considered the granting of a

"preliminary injunction" or "injunction" as that term is used in Rule 65A, and therefore
there is no evidence in the record of any "injunction" issued on September 25, 2008.

15
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34.

At the conclusion of the September 25 th hearing, the Court directed

Plaintiffs' Counsel to prepare an order, 30 but counsel never prepared any "order" for the
hearing, nor has the Court entered any of its own. See Docket.

Issue I:

The court erred raising "staleness" sua sponte.

The court committed plain error by impermissibly abandoning its role as a neutral
arbiter to raise an issue not raised by Ross: "staleness." This surprise ruling
unconstitutionally denied Barnett his due process right to notice and the opportunity to be
heard thereon, and deprived him of a fair hearing before a fair, impartial tribunal since
the court was basically ruling favorably on its own argument.

It is well-settled that judges may not abandon their role as a neutral arbiter to raise
issues on behalf of a party, because the judge then becomes an advocate for that party.
Hilton Hotel and Pacific Reliance Insurance v. Industrial Commission, 897 P.2d 352,

356(Utah App l 995)("Raising an issue not addressed by the parties ... encroaches upon
the advocate responsibility conferred upon counsel."); Combe v. Warren's Family DriveInns, 680 P.2d 733, 736 (Utah 1984) ("It is error to adjudicate issues not raised"); Girard
v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 245,247 (Utah l 983)("Preservation of the integrity of the

adversarial system ... precludes the court from infringing upon counsel's role of
advocacy .... the interests of justice are not enhanced when the court exceeds its role as
arbiter by reaching out and deciding an issue that would otherwise be dead"); Chevron v.
State Tax Comm 'n, 847 P.2d 418 (UT App 1993)("Preservation of the integrity of the
30

September 25 th Transcript, pg.131,lines 2-6.
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adversarial system ... precludes the court from infringing upon counsel's role of
advocacy."); Waters v. Jorgenson, 2001 UT App 164 ,II 7 (since neither party requested
the court's action, "the findings [of the trial court] will have no force or effect").
The injury of such impermissible sua sponte rulings is well spelled out by the
Supreme Court in the following:
To begin, Justice Lee argues that we should decide this case against Mr. Rasabout
on the basis of the corpus linguistics research he has conducted sua sponte. But
because his rationale is so different in kind from any argument made by the
parties, Mr. Rasabout has never had a reasonable opportunity to present a different
perspective. This violates the very notion of our adversary system, which
"assures fairness by exempting a party from the inequity of [losing] on appeal on a
ground that [he] had no opportunity to address." "[W]e should not dilute [the
protections of our adversary system] by stretching their standards to justify our
consideration of [an argument] we find interesting or important." Moreover,
deciding this case on the basis of an argument not subjected to adversarial
briefing is a recipe for making bad law.

State v. Rasabout, 2015 UT 72, iJl 7.
The court independently researched law to prepare an argument on behalf of Ross
because it thought the issue "important," it then presented the argument to itself in
chambers and agreed with itself; all without Barnett having a "reasonable opportunity to
present a different perspective" through briefing so as to avoid "making bad law."
This was a clear denial of due process, and therefore requires the "staleness"
ruling to be vacated as void. Rasmussen v. Call, 188 P. 275 (Utah 1920)(sua sponte order
issued without due process "must be held to be a nullity and of no effect.").
It's worth noting for remand none of the federal law cited by the court is president,
nor does it constitute authority to deny a Rule 52/59 motion for being "stale."
17
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By failing to consider the merits, the court denied Barnett his constitutional rights
to an open court31 and due process, and denied him his due process right to have his
arguments heard.
[A tribunal] must at some point address the legal issues raised by a party appearing
before it. Due process includes "an opportunity to present [one's] case, that is,
[one's] evidence and [one's) contentions." Ignoring a party's legal contentions
denies the party a fair "opportunity to be heard and defend."

[W]e must conclude, as Tolman asserts, that his legal challenges went unheard
and that he was thereby denied due process.
Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 31-32 (Utah App. 199l)(citations
omitted).
Barnett's constitutional right to have his legal challenges heard supersedes the
courts' personal belief they are "stale."

31

This means that courts are open for the purpose of having any order or
iudgment assailed ... , precisely the same as they are open for the redress of
wrongs and for the enforcement of rights. If, therefore, the appellants had good
cause to believe, and in good faith did believe, that the order in questions was in
excess of the court's power or jurisdiction, or that it was improvidently issued and
for that reason vulnerable, ... then appellants not only were within their rights in
assailing it, but it was their duty to assail the order in a proper manner and at
the proper time, and to advise the client to that effect._ ... We are clearly of the
opinion, therefore, that under all of the circumstances appellants had a clear legal
right to assail the order in question, and therefore their conduct ... in
refusing to comply with the order forthwith did not constitute contempt.
In re Thomas, 190 P. 952 (Utah 1920)(holding parties and attorneys have the
constitutional right to challenge court mistakes under Article I, Section 11).
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Relief Requested: Reverse the sua sponte Ruling and remand for consideration of
the merits, unless the Court holds all activity void for lack of jurisdiction.

Issue II:
The court erred in not deciding whether the June 2012 Order was the
court's final appealable order.
The Motion for Clarification asked the court to definitively declare whether the
June 2012 Order was in fact the court's final appealable order or not. If not, the motion
would be prepared as a simple motion for reconsideration. But if it was determined to be
the final appealable order, then the motion would be briefed as a Rule 52/59 motion.
The court however refused to tell Barnett whether the June 2012 Order was its
final order or not. Instead it indicated that it was Judge Kennedy's intent that the June
2012 Order be the final word on the question of ownership, but such an observation is
meaningless when it comes to the procedural question of finality and appealability.
Barnett is entitled to know whether the Order was the final appealable order or not
so that it can pursue either reconsideration or its appeal rights. Indeed, this Court also
needs to know whether it was or was not the final appealable order in order to determine
its appellate jurisdiction.
Unlike main proceedings which often have a clear end which can be readily
appealed, supplemental proceedings are on a separate track, which do not always have a
clear ending point.
This has forced Barnett and his counsel to file several appeals in order to preserve
the opportunity to appeal, just in case it is determined any of the rulings are determined to
19
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be the final appealable order. But this is costly and inefficient for both the Court and the
litigants.
This Court should hold that it is the responsibility of the trial court to make a clear
declaration as to when a supplemental proceeding is final and appealable so that litigants
and the appellate courts do not have to guess anymore.
Relief requested: remand with directive to determine whether the June 2012 was
or was not in fact the final appealable order.

Issue III:
The court has repeatedly abused its discretion by refusing to entertain
challenges to alleged mistakes by its predecessor.
One of the reasons given by the court for not addressing the Motion on the merits
was the mistaken premise that for Judge Harris to review Judge Kennedy's work Judge
Harris would be impermissibly acting as if he were an appellate court.
This is, however, part of the job when one inherits a caseload from a retiring judge
because Judge Harris and Judge Kennedy are considered one judicial officer. Therefore
Judge Kennedy's mistakes have effectively become Judge Harris' mistakes, at least for
purposes of entertaining challenges thereto, as was recently made clear by this Court in

Blackmore v. L&D Development, 2016 UT App 130.
After recognizing "[t]he Utah Supreme Court has explained that the substitution of
a new judge does not alter the court's discretion to modify a prior decision." this Court
noted:
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"This is true even when a second judge has taken over the case because
the two judges, while different persons, constitute a single iudicial
office." Three situations require the court to reconsider a matter: "(1)
when there has been an intervening change of authority; (2) when new
evidence has become available; or (3) when the court is convinced that
its prior decision was clearly erroneous and would work a manifest
iniustice." These exceptions to the law of the case doctrine "function
only to dictate when the district court has no discretion but rather
must reconsider a previously decided, unappealed issue." Id.
Id. 131 (citations omitted).
Consequently, Judge Harris would not be acting as an appellate judge reviewing
Judge Kennedy's actions, but rather would be effectively reviewing his own inherited
rulings, as if he had made them himself. Furthermore, he has no discretion to not
reconsider a ruling by Judge Kennedy if Judge Kennedy in fact made a clearly erroneous
decision that would work a manifest injustice, such as the many mistakes at issue in this
case.
Judge Kennedy's disregard of his lack of subject-matter jurisdiction has obviously
worked a manifest injustice by forcing Barnett to repeatedly defend his property from
void attempts to seize it. Judge Kennedy's mistake as to whether the court obtained
personal jurisdiction over Barnett has likewise forced Barnett to repeatedly have to
defend himself from void actions. Judge Kennedy's insistence that he rely on his flawed
personal recollections as to what happened in September 2008, rather than simply read
the transcripts which prove his personal recollections are flawed, has forced Barnett and
counsel to repeatedly defend against frivolous claims they have not complied with
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mythical orders. Judge Kennedy's repeated attempts to hold Barnett and his counsel in
contempt when he lacked any jurisdiction to do so has been yet more juridical purgatory.
And of course Judge Kennedy's omnibus mistake in erroneously finding as he
walked out the door that every paper/motion filed by Barnett's counsel that challenged
his mistakes lacked any factual or legal basis, and therefore warranted Rule 11 sanctions
in the form of attorney fees, compounded the numerous fundamental mistakes and added
significant financial insult to injury.
Had Judge Harris been willing to properly entertain the legitimate challenges to
these mistakes once he inherited them, and actually corrected them, as was his duty in
response to the subject Motion, Judge Kennedy's litany of mistakes could have been
unraveled years ago and this appeal would not even be needed (nor would any of the
others). But instead, Judge Harris has repeatedly refused to even entertain requests to
correct Judge Kennedy's obvious errors and has instead actually built upon those
mistakes, and awarded Rule 11 sanctions where there was no Rule 11 violation. And so
on, and so on.
Space does not permit a full recitation of all of the mistakes of Judge Kennedy that
Judge Harris could have, and should have, fixed. But it would be particularly helpful, if
as the Court remands this case for further proceedings involving Judge Harris reviewing
Judge Kennedy's June 2012 Order, if it would clarify for Judge Harris, that Judge
Kennedy's mistakes which have worked a manifest injustice must still be addressed and
corrected by him on remand if requested.
22
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Relief Requested: Reverse the sua sponte Ruling and remand with directions to
entertain the challenges to Judge Kennedy's actions, with a clarification that until it does
so there is not a final appealable judgment in the supplemental proceedings involving
Barnett, and therefore the court remains obligated to entertain challenges regarding
clearly erroneous mistakes made in the supplemental proceedings by Judge Kennedy in
the hopes of avoiding the need for any more appeals.
ISSUE IV:
The court erred in assuming subject matter jurisdiction over the
ownership dispute in supplemental proceedings.

Despite the fact the Motion expressly raised the court's lack of subject matter
jurisdiction to conduct any supplemental proceedings involving Barnett, REC.8549, the
court failed to even mention, let alone rule on the jurisdictional challenge. This was plain
error since subject-matter jurisdiction may be challenged at any time, including for the
first time here on appeal, 32 and therefore the jurisdictional challenge in the Motion could
not possibly become "stale." It must now be addressed by this Court here on appeal.
The case law is clear that supplemental proceedings cannot be used to try to
adjudicate ownership disputes involving non-parties, as occurred here, because trial
court's lack subject-matter jurisdiction to do so.
The Supreme Court has declared: "This court has held, where an interest is
claimed in the property by a party not a party to the record or proceedings that the court

32

"[A] challenge to the subject matter jurisdiction ... can be raised at any time,
including for the first time on appeal." Brown v. Div. Water Rights, 2010 UT

14, ,r13;
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in supplementary proceedings is without jurisdiction to determine conflicting
claims." Cleverly v. District Court, 39 P.2d 748, 751 (Utah 1935)(citing to Wallace,
Smuin & Co. v. McLaughlin, 43 P. 109, 111 (Utah 1895)). See also Keyser v. Erickson,
211 P. 698, 700 (Utah 1922)(when non-party claims title, the "only course ... is to bring
a [separate] action to obtain possession of the property in dispute," where the dispute may
be resolved by a jury); Houser v. Smith, 56 P. 683,686 (Utah 1899)("Courts have no
right to dispose of and adjudicate upon the property rights of persons who are not parties
to the case"). 33
The forgoing case law is explicit, and it is binding in this case on this Court.
The underlying analysis of these holdings is that a court only obtains subjectmatter jurisdiction over a specific subject matter if it is expressly raised by the
pleadings. 34 So when an ownership dispute with a non-party is raised for the first time in
33

These cases also show the error of the Court entering a judgment against Counsel when
he is not a party, which error must also be reversed by vacating the July 2 nd Judgment
against Counsel.
34
"The scope of litigation is framed by the complaint at the time it is filed." Macris &
Assocs Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 986 P.2d 748, 111 (Utah App. 1999).
[H]ow can a court acquire jurisdiction of the particular contention except it be
clearly marked out and precisely defined by the pleadings of the parties? ... It
is only over those particular interests which they choose to bring in issue by
proper pleadings that the power of jurisdiction arises.
West v. Shirtliff, 79 P. 180, 181 (Utah 1904).
It is fundamental that pleadings are the juridicial means of investing a court with
jurisdiction of the subject-matter to adjudicate it; and that a court can judicially
consider only what is presented by the pleadings.

In re Evans, 130 P. 217,225 (Utah 1913)(emphasis added).
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the supplemental proceedings, the court cannot adjudicate the dispute because any
potential general jurisdiction over that specific subject matter, involving that third person,
has not been raised by the pleadings.
To this day, Ross has never even tried to explain how the court (and now this
Court) supposedly had/has subject matter jurisdiction to make any adjudication of the
ownership dispute (as asserted by Ross) between GFS and Barnett as a non-party, even
though he clearly had/has the burden to do so: "When a jurisdictional question arises, the
burden to establish it rests upon the party asserting that jurisdiction exists." Thompson v.

Jackson, 743 P.2d 1230, 1232 (Utah App 1987).
Before it addresses any other issue in this appeal, this court must address the
threshold question of whether the trial court had any subject-matter jurisdiction to
conduct any of the supplemental proceedings involving Barnett or his Counsel, for if it
didn't, all such proceedings are void, and this appeal may be quickly resolved by simply
vacating and dismissing all supplemental proceedings, rulings, orders, etc. involving
Appellants as void.

"If a court acts beyond its authority those acts are null and void. Therefore the
initial inquiry of any court should always be to determine whether the requested action is
within its jurisdiction. When a matter is outside the court's jurisdiction it retains only
"Where the court transcends the pleadings and issues its orders are not
voidable, but void." Hammond v. Wall, 171 P. 148, 152 (Utah 1917). "[A] judgment
must be responsive to the issues framed by the pleadings. Any findings rendered
outside the issues are a nullity." Combe v. Warren's Family Drive-Inns, 680 P.2d 733,
736 (Utah 1984).
25
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the authority to dismiss the action." Varian-Eimac, Inc. v. Lamoreaux, 767 P.2d 569,
570 (Utah App. 1989). "Without subject matter jurisdiction a court cannot proceed."
Burns Chiropractic Clinic v. Allstate, 851 P.2d 1209, 1211 (Utah App. 1993).
Upon determination by the Court that its jurisdiction is lacking, its
authority extends no further than to dismiss the action. . .. Consequently, we
set aside as void ... all other orders entered in this action, ...
Thompson v. Jackson, 743 P.2d 1230 (Utah App. 1987):
[I]f the court [improperly] assumes jurisdiction ... and attempts to hear and
determine a cause, any iudgment which it may render will be null and void,
and of no effect whatever. The only power it has, under such circumstances, is to
dismiss the case.
Konold v Rio Grande Western Ry. Co. 51 P. 256 (Utah 1897).
No valid judgment can be rendered for or against one who was not a party to the
action, and a iudgment so given is void as far as concerns the person improperly
included in it, ...
Rolando v Dist. Court, 271 P. 225, 226 (Utah 1928).
As per Cleverly, et al, this Court must hold the court never obtained any subjectmatter jurisdiction to decide who owns the assets, and therefore the September 2008
hearings were void ab initio, any purported rulings were void, and all of the court's
"subsequent proceedings" involving Barnett and Counsel were also "palpably null and
void." Bott v Bott, 437 P.2d 329 (Utah 1968), and must be vacated.
"A void judgment is really no judgment. It leaves the parties litigant in the same
position as they were in before trial. It leaves them in exactly the same position as if no
trial had taken place. Such a judgment confers authority upon no one to enforce it."
State v. Bates, 61 P. 905, (Utah 1900). As the Supreme Court further explained:
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"A void judgment," says Mr. Black, "is in reality no judgment at all. It is a
mere nullity. It is attended by none of the consequences of a valid adjudication,
nor is it entitled to the respect accorded to one. It can neither affect, impair, nor
create rights .. .As to the person in whose favor it professes to be, it places him in
no better position than he occupied before; it gives him no new right, but an
attempt to enforce it will place him in peril. It is not necessary to take any steps
to have it reversed, vacated, or set aside. But whenever it is brought up against
a party, he may assail its pretensions and show its worthlessness. It is supported
by no presumptions, and may be impeached in any action, direct or collateral."
This Court now has the constitutional duty to correct the trial court's blatant and
persistent disregard of its jurisdictional limitations by vacating all of the court's
supplemental proceedings relating to Barnett and his Counsel. "[l]f jurisdiction is
lacking, the judgment cannot stand without denying due process to the one against whom
it runs." State. v. Vijil, 784 P.2d 1130, 1132 (Utah 1989).
"[I]f the judgment is determined to be void, the court has no discretion, and the
judgment must be set aside." Workman v. Nagle Construction, Inc., 802 P.2d 749, 754 fn
11 (Utah App 1990).
This will naturally resolve this entire appeal since it will render moot all other
issues, except entitlement to attorney fees to be decided on remand.
Relief requested: Vacate all rulings or orders adversely impacting Barnett and/or
Counsel as being void ab initio.

Issue V:
Judge Kennedy erred in holding the court had personal jurisdiction
over Barnett when he only appeared specially under Rule 64(e)(l) to protect his
property from unlawful seizure.
Barnett is not a named party to the proceedings, and has not submitted himself
personally to the general jurisdiction of the Court. His limited appearances as a Rule
27
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64(e)(l) Third-Person Claimant on September 25, 2008 to oppose the March 14th Writ,
and his repeat Rule 64(e)(l) limited appearance to attack the December 2, 2008 Writ,
prevented the court from obtaining general jurisdiction over him. See e.g. Ted R.Brown

and Assocs. v. Carnes Corp., 547 P.2d 206,207 (Utah 1976)(appearing to object to writ
of attachment not general appearance); Price v. Hanson, 206 P. 272 (Utah )(appearance
to move to quash garnishments not general appearance).
Regardless of Judge Kennedy's own belief that he had personal jurisdiction over
Barnett simply because he said so, he didn't. "A special appearance cannot be converted
into a general appearance by an order of the court." Glasmann v. Second District Court,
12 P.2d 361, 363 (Utah 1932).
In order for the Court to have ever obtained personal jurisdiction over Barnett, he
needed to be named as a defendant and served a summons and complaint.
"It is axiomatic that a court acquires power to adjudicate by proper service
of process which imparts notice that the defendant is being sued and must
appear and defend or suffer a default judgment. In that manner a court acquires
iurisdiction to enter a iudgment against a party."

Meyers v. Interwest Corp., 632 P.2d 879, 880 (Utah 1981 ).
Service of Summons in conformance with the mode prescribed by statute is
deemed jurisdictional, for it is service of process, ... which confers iurisdiction.
. . . The proper issuance and service of summons is the means of invoking the
jurisdiction of the court and acquiring iurisdiction over the defendant; these
cannot be supplanted by mere notice by letter, telephone or any other such
means."

Murdock v. Blake, 484 P.2d 164, 167 (Utah 1971).
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In the absence of proper service, the court never obtained personal jurisdiction
over Barnett, and any action against him is "void" as a matter of law. See generally
Classic Cabinets, Inc. v. All Am. Life Ins. Co., 1999 UT App 88 if9.
"[I]f [personal] jurisdiction is lacking, the judgment cannot stand without denying
due process to the one against whom it runs." Bonneville Billing v Whatley, 949 P .2d 768
(Utah App 1997)(default judgment was "void" due to lack of proper service - which
meant court never acquired personal jurisdiction).
Since neither Barnett nor his Counsel have ever been served process in this case,
the Court has never acquired personal jurisdiction over either of them. This once again
renders all actions void and renders the remaining issues moot.
Relief requested: Reverse all rulings or orders adversely affecting Barnett or
Counsel as void, ab initio.

Issue VI:
Judge Kennedy erred in not entering adequate findings of fact and
conclusions of law for the September 25th hearing, as required by Rule 52.
Since Judge Kennedy purportedly was acting as a fact finder on September 25,
2008, he was obligated to make findings of fact and conclusions of law as mandated by
Rule 52. He didn't.
This Court therefore cannot effectively review his undisclosed findings or the
analysis behind them, nor can the Appellants or even the trial court which is part of the
reason it concluded the Motion was stale..
We have said that a trial court is required to make explicit findings of fact
in support of its legal conclusions. . . . The trial court's findings and conclusions
must reveal the trial court's reasoning clearly enough that an appellate court can
29
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apply the appropriate standard of review to each part of the trial court's ruling.
What we have before us is plainly insufficient for that purpose.
Griffith v. Griffith, 985 P.2d 255, 258 (Utah 1999).

This has prejudiced Barnett and Counsel, not only in the lack of disclosure, but
also in the fact the articulation of findings is part of the analytical process the Court is
obligated to perform, the absence of which is prejudicial.
We recognize as a matter of law the substantial prejudice inherent in the failure to
make adequate findings .... "The importance of complete, accurate, and consistent
findings of fact is essential to a proper determination by [a tribunal]." The findings
are an integral part of the logical process a tribunal must go through in reaching a
decision ... Once [a tribunal] attempts to state its findings, identify the applicable
law, and articulate its logic, it may discover that critical facts are not properly
before it, that the law is other than anticipated, or that its initial logic is flawed. In
such situations, a result contrary to the initial conclusions of the [tribunal] may be
dictated..... Without the safeguard of adequate findings, there is no guarantee that
the [tribunal] followed a logical process in reaching its decision.
Adams v. Industrial Commission 821 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1991).

Relief requested: Reverse any perceived ruling or order based on the purported
findings from September 25, 2008, and remand for the court prepare adequate findings,
with the charge that if in attempting to do so it discovers that Judge Kennedy's initial
determinations were flawed, that it render the correct ruling based on the evidence in the
record.
ISSUE VII: Any purported finding of ownership by GFS was clearly erroneous since

there was no evidence at all that GFS purportedly owned the assets and not Barnett.
Barnett showed on September 25 th he is the author and owner of the copyrights
and owned 100% of the stock of TIFRM.
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Plaintiffs tried to show that Ross did not know who owned the assets, or that GFS
did not publish the CITRMS course as Ross anticipated it would, but none, absolutely
none, of the evidence presented had anything to do with who actually owned the assets.
Consequently, there is no evidence in the record to be marshaled in support of any
purported rulings that GFS owns any of the assets.
Any perceived finding that GFS owned any of the assets must be reversed because

"If absolutely no evidence exists in the record to support a district court's finding, that
finding is clearly erroneous." Or/ob v. Wasatch Medical Management, 124 P.3d 269
(Utah App 2005). See also Moyes v. State, 699 P.2d 748, 751 (Utah 1985)(findings of
facts are arbitrary or capricious if the record lacks any evidence to support them).
Requested relief: Since this ruling will have a ripple effect beyond the possible
scope of this appeal, any ruling or order based directly or indirectly on the falsely recalled
rulings must be reversed, and the case remanded for the trial court to identify and vacate
them, in particular, Barnett's assets must finally be released from the March 14th Writ and
the December 2 nd Writ because they are exempt from seizure and execution. Similarly,
the sanctions against Counsel for challenging Judge Kennedy's clearly erroneous
"findings" must be set aside.

Issue VIII: Judge Kennedy repeatedly erred by relying on his personal recollection
that he made findings from the bench regarding ownership of each asset when he
did not make such rulings.
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Judge Kennedy repeatedly insisted he recalled finding from the bench on
September 25, 2008 that GFS owned each of the specific assets, not Barnett.
But there is no record of such findings anywhere in the September 25, 2008
transcript. 35
Judge Kennedy nevertheless steadfastly refused to ever take judicial notice of the
record, by simply reading the September 25 th Transcript, whereby he would have learned
he never actually made any ruling "GFS owns TIFRM, not Barnett." 36
The same goes for the other assets. There is no finding that GFS owns CITRMS
and not Barnett; or that GFS owns CasePlanner™ and not Barnett.
Judge Kennedy's flawed personal recollection, fed by the continuing
misrepresentations of Ross' counsel in violation of his Rule 3.3 duty of candor, 37 was
directly contrary to the record, and therefore anytime Judge Kennedy relied on his flawed

35

Nor do they exist in the September 15, 2008 transcript, as Ross' counsel falsely
represented in the Motion to Compel REC.2100, and the proposed order he prepared,
with a false finding Judge Kennedy improperly mechanically adopted as the May 6 th
Order. REC.2733.
36
Nor is there any explanation in the Transcript as to how GFS could own TIFRM when
it is undisputed Barnett owned 100% of the stock and had possession thereof, and was its
sole officer and director, having set up the corporation with his own money to market his
own property.
37
Ross' counsel, Mr. Bogart, is still obligated under Rule 3 .3 to admit to this Court that
he made a false misrepresentation to Judge Kennedy as to the existence of the rulings,
and refused to correct it as required by Rule 3.3 since he refuses to do so below. Had he
done so in a timely manner, most of the proceedings in this case never would have
happened. But because Mr. Bogart continued to mislead Judge Kennedy, Judge Kennedy
continued to believe a lie. Mr. Bogart is still obligated now to be candid to this Court by
finally admitting that he did in fact mislead Judge Kennedy to believe he made rulings he
did not in fact make.
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personal recollection he denied Barnett and Counsel their constitutional right to a fair
hearing before a fair tribunal willing to admit its own mistakes.
Relief requested: Reverse all rulings or orders based in whole or in part upon
Judge Kennedy's flawed personal recollections that he made findings as to ownership of
the assets from the bench generally, and remand for the court to address the ripple effect
by identifying each such ruling or order and vacate them, and award sanctions against
Ross' counsel under Rule 40 if he does not admit that he misrepresented to Judge
Kennedy in his Motion to Compel and the proposed order therefore that he did in fact
make such rulings that do not in fact exist, and if he does not admit and stipulate that any
ruling based on the mythical rulings is void.
Judge Kennedy erred by relying on his personal recollection that he
Issue IX:
issued a "continuing" injunction against Barnett.
Likewise Judge Kennedy insisted he issued a "continuing" injunction on either
September 15 th or 25 th that Barnett not dissipate or divert the assets or funds of his
corporation TIFRM.
Once again there is absolutely no record of any such injunction in the September
Transcripts. And once again Judge Kennedy steadfastly refused to take judicial notice of
the record by reading the Transcripts which would have revealed to him that he was
mistaken.
There was a defective oral TRO on September 15 th not to take any funds out of the
TIFRM bank account for ten days until the next hearing on the 25 th , which unlawful
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freeze was extended on September 25 th without a set period, which means the freeze
expired ten days later on October 5, 2008. 38 But that is the only injunctive order issued
on September 25, 2008.
Appellants have repeatedly requested that the court or Ross's attorney actually
quote the order from the transcript, but they have refused to do so, because it simply does
not exist.
Nevertheless, Ross has once again falsely asserted repeatedly it does exist and has
even brought a Motion to Compel compliance with the mythical order, and has even
convinced Judge Kennedy to find Barnett in contempt for not complying with the
mythical injunction, and sanctioning him by ordering him to turn over property belonging
to himself and TIFRM.
Even though he knew there was no such "continuing" injunction, Ross' counsel
has again violated Rule 3.3 by telling the Court that there is in fact such an injunction,
and again by not admitting to Judge Kennedy that his factual representations were false.
Had Mr. Bogart complied with his duty of candor as an officer of the court, these
protracted proceedings could have been totally avoided.
Relief requested: Reverse all rulings or orders based in whole or in part on any
purported injunction generally, and remand for the court to ripple it through by
identifying each such ruling or order and vacating it, and to award sanctions against
38

Birch Creek v Prothereo, 858 P.2d 990 (Utah 1993)(an extension of a TRO
automatically expires in 10 days, unless stipulated to by the parties).
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Ross' counsel under Rule 40 if he does not admit to this Court that no such injunction
was issued in September of 2008, and if he does not admit and stipulate that the rulings
he obtained based on the mythical injunction are void.

Issue X:
Judge Kennedy erred by not requiring a bond for the mythical
injunction, and then holding Barnett in contempt for not complying with the
inoperative injunction.
A mandatory precondition to the issuance of any injunctive order is a bond to
cover any damages and attorney fees of the parties restrained, in the event the order is
wrongfully granted, unless the Court expressly finds that no damages or attorney fees
could possibly be incurred. See Rule 65A(c). Judge Kennedy issued the oral TRO
without requiring a bond and without making a proper finding that no damages or fees
could be incurred therefrom.
According to the Supreme Court, the failure of the court in this case to require a
bond rendered any purported injunctive order "inoperative and void" and excused any
failure of Barnett to comply therewith, thereby preventing any punishment for contempt.
"Where the statute requires that the party applying for an injunction shall, as a
condition precedent to its issuance, execute a bond or undertaking, with sufficient
sureties, an injunction issued without such bond or undertaking is inoperative and
void and may be disregarded without danger of punishment for contempt."
Keyser v. Erickson 211 P. 698, 699-700 (Utah 1922).

Consequently, any purported "continuing injunction," if it exists, is "inoperative
and void" and Barnett could freely disregard it without being in contempt thereof.
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The May 6th Order purporting to punish him for doing so is therefore unlawful,
and must be reversed. As must the September 5th Order sanctioning him for not
complying with the void May 6th Order, and so on and so on.
Likewise, Barnett was under no obligation to comply with any injunctive order
issued without jurisdiction. "If a restraining order was made without jurisdiction it is

void;" The Bullion, Beck and Champion Mining Co. v. The Eureka Hill Mining Co., 12 P.
660, 660 (Utah 1887).
Relief requested: Declare that there in fact was no "continuing" injunction issued
in September 2008 prohibiting Barnett from dissipating or diverting any funds or assets
from TIFRM, or in the alternative, if Ross can actually identify such a "continuing"
injunction issued in September 2008, by quoting it, vacate it as void due to the failures to
comply with Rule 65A, in particular the lack of a bond, and the lack of any jurisdiction to
issue it, and reverse any contempt finding or sanctions based thereon generally, and
remand to have trial court manage the ripple effect by identifying all such findings and
sanctions and vacating them.

Issue XI:
The court denied Barnett his constitutional right to a fair hearing
before a fair tribunal when Judge Kennedy refused to recuse himself, and he was
not disqualified by his fellow judges.
Rule 2.11 of the Utah Code of Judicial Conduct explicitly mandates:
A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the
judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited
to the following circumstances: The judge has personal bias, or prejudice
concerning a party or a party's lawyer, or personal knowledge of facts that are
in dispute in the proceeding.
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Inasmuch as "impartiality" is defined in the Code of Judicial Conduct as requiring
a judge to have an "objective and open mind," Judge Kennedy's "impartiality" may be
reasonably questioned since the facts about what happened in September 2008 have
clearly been in dispute, and Judge Kennedy has been impermissibly relying on his
personal knowledge instead of the record.
In particular, Judge Kennedy might have been "tempted" to uphold his perceived
orders as lawful and enforceable, regardless of the validity of the challenges made
thereto. His impartiality may therefore be reasonably questioned by a person with full
knowledge of the law and his actions or omissions.
Indeed, Judge Kennedy's refusal to step down is itself an indication that he was
not impartial since he went against Justice Wade's encouragement:
If the judge is not biased and prejudiced, there does not seem to be any good
reason why, if a litigant in his court believes he is, that he should not get another
judge to try the case since the result of the litigation should be the same in both
~ . ....
I can think of nothing that would as surely bring the courts into disrepute as for a
iudge to insist on trying a case where one of the litigants believes that such
iudge is biased and preiudiced against him. This is especially true where the
judge in a previous case has made remarks which indicated that he questioned the
veracity or integrity of such litigant. I therefore believe that in such a case it
would be very desirable for the judge to disqualify himself whether he was in fact
biased and prejudiced against such party or not.

Haslam v. Morrison, I 90 P.2d 520, 523 (Utah 1948).
Judge Kennedy openly revealed his bias against Barnett early on:
[I]t's apparent to the court from everything that's happened that your client
has been doing everything he can to try to dissipate the assets of this
corporation to the detriment of plaintiff. And the Court has ruled that those
assets belong to the corporation and that your client should not be trying to
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Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

dissipate those assets .... And now I come in today with representations by Mr.
Hardy that he's doing it again.
Transcript January 27,2009 REC.8220, pg.49 lines 20-25 to pg.SO lines 1-3
Despite the fact "Petitioner is entitled to a neutral and detached judge in the
first instance," Ward v. Monroeville, 409 US 57 (1972), Barnett clearly was not going to

be judged by a neutral and detached judge. The deck was already stacked against him by
Judge Kennedy himself who made it clear he was going to teach Barnett a lesson he
would not soon forget.
The US Supreme Court has set a high bar by demanding under the Federal
Constitution the avoidance of even the appearance of possible partiality such as that
manifested by Judge Kennedy in this case by demanding recusal if the probity of the
judge's actions are at issue, since a judge cannot fairly be judge of his own case:
A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process. Fairness
of course requires an absence of actual bias in the trial of cases. But our system of
law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness. To
this end no man can be judge in his own case and no man is permitted try
cases where he has an interest in the outcome. That interest cannot be defined
with precision. Circumstances and relationships must be considered. This Court
has said however, that "every procedure which would offer a possible temptation
to the average man as a judge ... not to hold the balance nice, clear and true
between the State and the accused, denies the latter due process of law." Such a
stringent rule may sometimes bar trial judges who have no actual bias and who
would do their very best to weigh the scales of justice equally between contending
parties. But to perform its high function in the best way "justice must satisfy the
appearance of iustice."
In re Murchison, 349 US 133, 136 (1955)(citations omitted).
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Therefore the mere possible temptation for Judge Kennedy to want to uphold his
own actions disqualified him from continuing in the case under the Federal Constitution
because he had an "interest" in the outcome of the case.
At issue in Murchison was the disqualification of a judge who, like Judge
Kennedy, initiated contempt proceedings to hold the respondents in contempt for
violating his prior orders.
The Supreme Court pointed out that since the judge had been a part of the
underlying proceedings where the alleged contempt occurred:
he cannot be, in the very nature of things, wholly disinterested in the conviction
or acquittal of those accused. While he would not likely have all of the zeal of a
prosecutor, it can certainly not be said that he would have none of that zeal. Fair
trials are too important a part of our free society to let prosecuting iudges be
trial judges of the charges they prefer. ...
As a practical matter it is difficult if not impossible for a judge to free
himself from the influence of what took place in his "grand-jury" secret session.
His recollection of that is likely to weigh far more heavily with him that any
testimony given in the open hearings.
Id. at 138
The Supreme Court then identified the unacceptable possibility of a judge relying
on his own personal knowledge and impressions when hearing the contempt proceedings:
Thus the judge whom due process requires to be impartial in weighing the
evidence presented before him, called on his own personal knowledge and
impression of what had occurred in the grand jury room and his judgment was
based in part on this impression, the accuracy of which could not be tested by
adequate cross-examination.
Id at 138.
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Since the judge personally witnessed the events at issue, he "might himself[] be a
very material witness in a later trial for contempt." The Supreme Court explained the
obvious problems with this:

If the charge should be heard before that judge, the result would be either that the
defendant must be deprived of examining or cross-examining him or else there
would be the spectacle of the trial judge presenting testimony upon which he
must finally pass in determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant. In either
event the State would have the benefit of the iudge's personal knowledge
while the accused would be denied an effective opportunity to cross-examine.
The Supreme Court concluded: "The right of a defendant to examine and crossexamine witnesses is too essential to a fair trial to have that right jeopardized in such
way." Id.
Therefore, it held "it was a violation of due process for the [judge] to try these
petitioners" and it reversed the contempt judgments.
Consequently, the US Supreme Court has set a clear rule under the Federal
Constitution, as a matter of law (without any factual debate over actual bias, alleged bias,
etc.), that judges simply may not entertain contempt actions arising from proceedings
they presided over because they would automatically have a conflicted "interest" in
seeking a conviction for violating his or her order(s).
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized the stringent rule from Murchison
generally:
One of the fundamental principles of due process is that all parties to a case are
entitled to an unbiased, impartial judge. 'A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic
requirement of due process.' In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136, 99 L. Ed. 942,
75 S. Ct. 623 (1955). Fairness requires not only an absence of actual bias, but
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endeavors to prevent even the possibility of unfairness.
Anderson v. Industrial Comm 'n, 696 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Utah 1985).
This Court is therefore bound to apply Murchison in this case (even though the
trial court ignored Barnett's and counsel's constitutional challenges).
In the present case, since the lawfulness of Judge Kennedy's orders, that he
personally entered, or thought he entered, were directly at issue, he was personally aware
of the facts surrounding those rulings as a participant, and was therefore a "witness" with
personal knowledge as to some of what had happened in the underlying proceedings.
Judge Kennedy therefore already has his own personal observations, recollections,
knowledge and impressions, etc. concerning those orders, and whether they were lawful
and enforceable, clear and understandable, etc. No doubt he believed they were lawful or
he would not have issued them. So he did not start at a point of detached indifference,
but actually started at a point of likely bias in favor of reaffirming his own past actions.
There was no doubt that he might be "tempted" to rely upon his preexisting
opinion that he was acting properly when asked to reverse course. And Barnett would
not be able to effectively cross examine that personal, preexisting opinion of Judge
Kennedy, that might never be displayed.
What is particularly troublesome in this case is that the purported findings as to
ownership and the purported "continuing" injunction that Judge Kennedy was so adamant
about defending don't even exist in the record from September 2008. But Judge
Kennedy insisted they do exist. This made it particularly disconcerting when on January
27, 2009, he automatically refused to even allowing counsel to articulate Barnett's
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position without repeatedly interrupting Counsel to insist he would not allow Barnett to
"re-litigate" the question of ownership. This was not a detached neutral response.
This same disqualifying "interest" in defending his own past actions manifested
itself when Judge Kennedy repeatedly refused to take judicial notice of the record that
would have proved him to be absolutely wrong, insisting that "his own personal
knowledge and impression of what had occurred" was accurate. It manifested itself when
Judge Kennedy repeatedly refused to accept the fact he lacked any jurisdiction to
determine any ownership claims involving Barnett, despite the fact the same governing
case law presented here was presented to him repeatedly.
The disqualifying "interest" manifested itself again when without even holding an
order to show cause hearing, or taking any evidence, he summarily concluded
prematurely that Barnett knew what he was required to do and knowingly refused to do it
and therefore held him to be in contempt.
His disqualifying "interest" manifested itself when he sua sponte ordered Barnett
to appear and show cause why he should not be held in contempt, even though a
mandatory jurisdictional affidavit had not been filed so as to give him any jurisdiction to
do so. It arose when he authorized a $10,000 bench warrant for failing to appear when
Barnett who now lives in a trailer in Missouri and could not afford to come to Utah. It
showed up when Judge Kennedy imposed a patently unlawful per diem fine that is
currently accruing at $1,000/day, and will in perpetuity.
His disqualifying interest manifested itself when he ruled favor of Ross on every
single issue on every single motion for over six years, often saying simply "for the
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reasons stated in Plaintiffs memorandum," even when Plaintiffs' memoranda did not
even address the issue. And when he would allow Ross to prepare proposed orders full
of holdings he never made, and even issues never raised, and then mechanically sign
them.
His disqualifying "interest" in proving himself right was strongest as he was
walking out the door to retirement and in one final parting shot refused to give counsel a
reasonable opportunity to be heard on his challenges to the omnibus Rule 11 motion,
holding that it was unchallenged (even though it clearly was challenged on jurisdictional
grounds accompanied by a request for a continuance to deal with the jurisdictional
challenges first). He simultaneously denied the jurisdictional challenges and the requests
for continuance and refused to allow counsel any time to prepare a substantive response
so that he could be the one to rule on the Motion before he left the bench. And then, he
falsely held that not a single paper filed by Counsel at issue had any legal or factual
support, and therefore awarded attorney fees for some 20 plus motions and papers post
hoc, (depriving Counsel of his safe harbor rights under Rule 11 ). His "interest" showed

when he ruled without bothering to make the mandatory Rule 11 findings showing how
each offending paper in fact was contrary to governing law, and totally frivolous, and
how each fact asserted was false and critical. 39 It showed when he summarily held
without any analysis that each and every single paper challenged violated Rule 11. This
disqualifying self-interest is even more obvious when one simply reads through the
39

This failure to comply with the Rule 11 finding requirement set out in Griffin v. Griffin,
985 P.2d 255, 258 (Utah 1999) requires reversal and remand for the entry of proper
findings.
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volumes of papers prepared by counsel and sees the mounds of legal support, most of
which had never even been opposed by any law submitted by Ross, but was nevertheless
summarily ignored by Judge Kennedy anyway because it would have prevented him from
preserving his perceived rulings. Likewise, the fact that the facts asserted, especially
those regarding the record, were indisputable, confirm Judge Kennedy's self-interest
when he summarily falsely declared that there was no factual support in any of the
papers.
The fact that Counsel anticipated such mischief because Judge Kennedy would
likely be "tempted" to protect his past rulings when he immediately on January 27, 2009
started asserting that he had done things he in fact had not done, was why the Motion to
Disqualify was filed, and it is why it should have been automatically granted based on the
Federal Constitutional challenge alone, without regard to whether the separate,
independent statutory grounds set forth in Rule 63(b) (prejudice, bias, partiality) were
also proven.
Judge Kennedy's continued involvement in the case after the Motion to Disqualify
him was a clear denial of Barnett's and Counsel's right to due process and an open court
wherein Barnett and Counsel could fully, freely and successfully challenge the prior
improper activities or omissions of Judge Kennedy.
Due process required a judge who was indifferent to holding that Judge Kennedy's
prior rulings and orders were unlawful, or void, or unenforceable. Only a judge willing
to openly hold Judge Kennedy had made mistakes, and willing to correct those mistakes,
could be considered a fair and open-minded tribunal capable of providing Appellants
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their due process and open court rights.
Appellants knew from experience, Judge Kennedy clearly was not that judge.
Which is why there was a Motion to Disqualify him on Constitutional grounds as well as
statutory grounds set forth in Rule 63(b).
The court, however, repeatedly refused to rule on the constitutional half of the
Motion. Rather, the court only ruled on the Rule 63(b) statutory part, apparently failing
to realize that each motion was brought based on two separate and independent rights:
constitutional and statutory. 40
The motions to disqualify were brought primarily to assert Barnett's and
Counsel's fundamental constitutional right to have a fair hearing before a fair tribunal.
This right of disqualification arises not from Rule 63(b), but rather, is a self-effectuating
right granted by the Constitutions themselves. When the judges refused to even address
the constitutional challenges, it further denied Barnett and Counsel their due process
rights to a fair hearing before a fair tribunal.
The court each time improperly considered only the alternative Rule 63(b) motion,
and found it untimely, or otherwise legally insufficient, barred etc. and therefore
erroneously denied the entire motion both the Rule 63(b) challenge and the constitutional
challenge, without ever addressing the constitutional challenge. This was a plain error.
There are no time limits, or numerical limits, on constitutional challenges to
disqualify, nor could there be. For the right to a fair hearing before a fair tribunal is a
self-effectuating constitutional right that continues throughout a proceeding and cannot
40

Ruling by Judge Maughan, REC.675; Ruling by Judge Barrett, REC.922.
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be impaired by arbitrary procedural limitations, especially a limit on the number of times
one may seek to remove a judge that continues to grow bolder and bolder.
The court therefore erred by imposing the statutory limitations of Rule 63(B), in
particular the perceived arbitrary limitation of only one motion to disqualify per action,
on the independent constitutional challenges, which have no limit and can be brought
whenever needed. The court thereby denied Appellants their Federal Constitutional right
to have Judge Kennedy disqualified from being the judge of his own case each time it
refused to disqualify him, all on the mistaken belief that the Utah Supreme Court can
limit the federal constitutional rights by adopting limits in Rule 63(b).41

It is readily apparent that a different, open minded, judge, uncommitted to
defending Judge Kennedy's past actions would have likely immediately resulted in a
different course since an open-minded judge, properly doing its job, would have reviewed
the law and understood the court lacked any jurisdiction to do anything to Barnett; would
have reviewed the record and discovered there was no evidence at all that GFS owned
any of the assets; would have reviewed the record and discovered there were no rulings
of ownership from the bench or a "continuing" injunction issued in September 2008 that
could be enforced. And a different, open-minded judge would not for next six years tried
to enforce a mythical order based on non-existent findings.

41

The court also failed analytically to recognize that contempt proceedings are separate
actions, and therefore Rule 63 reset for each contempt proceeding, and it failed to
recognize that Barnett and Counsel are separate "litigants" and therefore they each had
their own rights to invoke Rule 63(b) separately.
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Since the same result would not be likely between Judge Kennedy and a different
judge, Judge Kennedy clearly should have recused himself voluntarily, and the Judges
who reviewed the motions to disqualify him also should have disqualified him, even
under Rule 63(b).
This Court must restore Barnett's, and by extension Counsel's, Constitutional
rights which were violated by Judge Kennedy being the judge of his own case by
vacating all of Judge Kennedy's rulings as being void for being entered in disregard of
Appellants' federal rights to due process, as set forth in Murchison, for this is the only
way to not only cure the harm done by Judge Kennedy, but also to ensure that in the
future other judges will comply with Murchison as the governing law, and thereby
preserve the integrity of the judicial system. As the Utah Supreme Court has urged:
The purity and integrity of the judicial process ought to be protected against any
taint of suspicion to the end that the public and litigants may have the highest
confidence in the integrity and fairness of the courts. This is not to say that the
mere filing of an affidavit of bias and prejudice, ipso facto casts such suspicion on
the judge, and upon his integrity and fairness, that he ought to disqualify himself.
However, it is ordinarily better for a judge to disqualify himself even though
he may be entirely free of bias and prejudice if either litigant files an affidavit
of bias and prejudice.
"Next in importance to the duty of rendering a righteous judgment is that of
doing it in such a manner as will beget no suspicion of the fairness or
integrity of the judge."
Haslam v. Morrison, 190 P.2d 520, 523-24 (Utah 1948)(citation omitted).
Relief requested: Vacate all actions by Judge Kennedy beginning on January 27,
2009 when it became apparent that the probity of his actions would be challenged and he
failed to recuse himself.
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Issue XII: The court repeatedly erred in holding contempt proceedings without a
mandatory jurisdictional affidavit being filed.
Both the contempt statute, UCA 78B-6-302(2), and the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, Rule 7(b )(2), require the filing of an affidavit showing with particularity a
violation of an "existing," "lawful" order before a court acquires any jurisdiction to
enforce one of its orders.
This statutory requirement exists because contempt actions are a new and separate
action from the principle proceeding where the alleged contempt reportedly occurred which requires a separate pleading and service as the Supreme Court explained in

Robinson v. City Court Ogden, 185 P.2d 256, 258-259 (Utah 1947)(citations omitted):

A Contempt proceeding is separate and apart from the principle action
and in order for the court to acquire jurisdiction of the offense when committed, as
here, it is necessary that an affidavit or initiating pleading be filed. Unless this is
done, subsequent proceedings are palpably null and void.
The affidavit takes the place of the complaint, and whether the contempt
be regarded as civil or criminal, when not committed in the presence of the court
or the judge in his chambers, the court is without iurisdiction to proceed until a
pleading of some nature has been served on the accused and filed with the court.
See also, Burgers v. Maiben, 652 P.2d 1320 (Utah l 982)("A contempt action is
separate from the principal action."); Bott v. Bott, 437 P.2d 684, 685 (Utah 1968); Jones
v. Cox, 37 P.2d 777 (Utah 1934)("A contempt proceeding is a separate proceeding from

an action pending and out of which the alleged contemptuous conduct arose, and ...
requires an affidavit or pleading to support the charge").
Since Plaintiffs failed to file such an affidavit in support of its October 23, 2012
contempt Motion to Compel compliance with the non-existent "continuing" injunction,
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its "subsequent proceedings are palpably null and void," including the May 6 th Order
issued in response to the contempt motion. And any "subsequent proceedings" to enforce
the May 6th Order.
Therefore, the Court could not even entertain the subsequent June I 0, 2013
Motion for Sanctions alleging Barnett was in contempt of a lawful order for not
complying with the void May 6th Order, because it was all void.
Since the May 6, 2013 Order was palpably null and void ab initio, Barnett had no
duty to comply with it. Any alleged failure to comply was not disobedience of a "lawful"
order. Judge Kennedy should have vacated it as void when requested to do so, but
refused. Consequently, the "subsequent" September 5, 2013 finding of contempt for
failing to comply with the void May 6th Order, REC.4024, is also null and void, and
Barnett had no duty to comply with it, either, and so on and so on.
Nor could Barnett be held in contempt for not complying with Judge Kennedy's
void attempt to order him sua sponte to appear on August 20, 2014. When there was
once again no mandatory affidavit giving him any jurisdictional authority to do so. See
Order to Appear REC.4523. Since Barnett had no duty to appear, Judge Kennedy's
"subsequent" decision to hold Barnett and Counsel in contempt for not appearing on
August 20 th was void as well.
Relief requested: The May 6th Order, REC.2973, the September 5th Order,
th
REC.4024, the June 25 Order to Show Cause and Order to Appear, REC.4523, the
spontaneous ruling on August 2ot\ and the December 17th Order, REC.5143, and any
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other contempt findings or sanctions must all be vacated for lack of contempt jurisdiction
and/or a lawful, enforceable order.

XIII: Judge Kennedy erred by holding Barnett in contempt for not obeying
unlawful orders.

ISSUE

Because Judge Kennedy refused to recognize his jurisdictional limitations, he
failed to recognize that his orders involving Barnett have all been void, and he has failed
to recognize that he could not hold Barnett or Counsel in contempt of his void orders.
"It is fundamental that disobedience of an order of court which was issued without

jurisdiction cannot be the basis of a finding and judgment for contempt." Mellor v. Cook,
597 P.2d 882, 884 (Utah 1979). "A failure to comply with a void judgment is not
contempt." In re Roger's Estate, 284 P. 992, 997 (Utah 1930).
Since a motion for contempt "involves two questions: first, whether the underlying
order is lawful; and second, whether the party's conduct in violation of the order
constitutes contempt of court," Envirotech Corp v. Callahan, 872 P.2d 487,497 (UT
App 1994), Judge Kennedy erred in not first evaluating whether his orders were lawful. .
Had he properly done so, he would have necessarily found each time that he
lacked any jurisdiction to issue any of his orders, because he lacked ( 1) subject matter
jurisdiction over any ownership disputes with a non-party, (2) personal jurisdiction over
Barnett as a Rule 64( e)( 1) third-person claimant, (3) contempt jurisdiction due to the lack
of affidavits, (4) personal jurisdiction in the contempt proceedings due to lack of service
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and lack of territorial jurisdiction, (5) territorial jurisdiction over TIFRM and its assets,
and so forth.
Since Appellants assert that every single court order issued by Judge Kennedy
lacked jurisdiction, it is up to Ross to show that the court in fact had jurisdiction to issue
any given order, if Ross wants to assert that Judge Kennedy had authority to issue it and
hold Appellants in contempt for not obeying it.
To the extent Ross fails to do so, Appellants are entitled to have any and all
contempt findings and sanctions vacated as void.
Relief requested: reverse all findings of contempt based on orders the court lacked
jurisdiction to enter, and remand for the trial court to identify all such rulings, orders and
sanctions and vacate them.
Issue XIV: The court never acquired personal jurisdiction over Barnett for any
contempt proceedings because he was never properly served.
As the Supreme Court noted in Robinson, "the court is without jurisdiction to
proceed [with a contempt action] until a pleading of some nature has been served on the
accused and filed with the court."
As to those contempt proceedings not initiated by affidavit, an affidavit obviously
was not served, and therefore no personal jurisdiction over Barnett was obtained to allow
the court to move forward with those proceedings.
Ross did file one defective affidavit in support of the Motion for Sanctions,
REC.3278, however it was not served on Barnett pursuant to Rule 4(d). Ross argued he
51
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served it electronically under Rule 5 on Barnett's counsel in the principle proceedings.
Ross, however, lacked any law on point to support his novel conclusion that you can
serve counsel in one proceeding papers for a different proceeding where Counsel has not
yet appeared.
This appears to be a question of first impression.
Presumably since a contempt proceeding is a new and separate proceeding, as
noted above, the same method for serving a complaint in any other new and separate
proceeding should apply to the service of the contempt affidavit, since it is a pleading
which stands in the place of a complaint - namely by personal service on the alleged
contemnor in compliance with Rule 4( d), since Rule 4(d) expressly governs the service of
a complaint.
Rule 5 does not save Ross since Subsection 5(a)(l )(C) states service is to be had
under the Rule upon all parties for "a pleading after the original complaint." Since a
contempt affidavit is the original "complaint," the post-complaint service rules in Rule 5
do not fit.
But even more damning to Ross is the fact that even if this Court holds Rule 5
does apply to contempt affidavits, then service must still be on Barnett personally. Rule
5(b)(l) states that service may only be had upon counsel "[i]f a party is represented by an
attorney." Since contempt proceedings are initiated by service at conception, before any
appearance of counsel possibly occurs in the new action, the alleged contemnor is
obviously not "represented by an attorney" yet. Since Barnett was not represented,
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service had to have been on him personally in one of the ways set forth in Rule S(b) since
it wasn't the court never acquired personal jurisdiction for the Motion for Sanctions
action.

Bradford v. Nagle, 763 P.2d 791 (Utah 1988)(ajudgment "entered without valid in
personam jurisdiction [] is null and void.").
Relief requested: vacate all contempt rulings or orders.
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES
Fees are requested under Rule 40 if Mr. Bogart does not admit/concede he
misrepresented to Judge Kennedy that he made the rulings he did not make and issue the
continuing judgment he did not issue.
It is also requested that when Appellants prevail that the Court allow them to seek

their fees for the appeal on remand under whatever claims may be appropriate.

Isl- - - - - - - - - - - - -

Douglas R. Short

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
I hereby certify this Brief complies with the type-volume limitations in that it
contains 13,956 words.

Isl- - - - - - - - - - - - -

Douglas R. Short
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the Appellant's Brief to be mailed
first class postage prepaid as follows:
John H. Bogart
Telos VG, PLLC
299 South Main Street, Suite 1300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
jbogart@telosvg.com
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